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We examined how people perceive and talk about miscommunication. Participants in study one recalled a miscommunication incident, and then responded to a set of questions regarding their perceptions of the incident. These miscommunications were viewed as relatively unserious, largely the fault of the sender, humorous, confusing and frustrating. Most (76.8%) of the time both interactants were aware of the miscommunication. In a second study we harvested all tweets containing the word “miscommunication” and compared them with tweets containing the word “communication”. Tweets about miscommunication were higher in negative emotionality and certain types of cognitive processing. Hence, the occurrence of miscommunication elicits levels of negative emotions and higher levels of cognition which we interpret as users attempting to make sense of the miscommunication. 

Unlike prior research examining how emoji communicate emotions and modify intended meanings, the present research examined whether emoji can perform specific speech acts (remind, etc.), and how well users are able to accurately assess their ability to do so. In four experiments senders were asked to assume that they would send a specific emoji to perform a certain speech act, or to choose which emoji they would use to perform that speech act. Senders and receivers indicated their judgments of communicative success (i.e., that the receiver would recognize the speech act being performed). In two studies, receivers also made judgments regarding the intended meaning of the emoji. Participants judged receivers to be likely to recognize the intended meaning conveyed with an emoji, and there was some evidence of communicative success. However, participants significantly overestimated communicative success, and in all studies, receivers were more optimistic about communicative success than were senders. 

In this commentary I provide a review of the microaggression construct within a linguistic-pragmatic framework. From this perspective, microaggressions can be viewed as nonconventional indirect speech acts, that is, utterances that, because of their aggressive meaning, require some type of inferential processing on the part of the hearer. This inferential process requires a consideration of the remark in the context within which it occurs, including the prior discourse, as well as the roles and statuses of the interactants. Because microaggressions are indirect, the speaker always has the option, especially if they are higher in power, of denying any aggressive meaning. Focusing on their linguistic/pragmatic features allows for the development of a more principled framework for specifying what constitutes a microaggression, as well as helping to identify the relevant features of the context and the processes involved in the recognition of microaggressions. 

In this commentary I provide a review of the microaggression construct within a linguistic-pragmatic framework. From this perspective, microaggressions can be viewed as nonconventional indirect speech acts, that is, utterances that, because of their aggressive meaning, require some type of inferential processing on the part of the hearer. This inferential process requires a consideration of the remark in the context within which it occurs, including the prior discourse, as well as the roles and statuses of the interactants. Because microaggressions are indirect, the speaker always has the option, especially if they are higher in power, of denying any aggressive meaning. Focusing on their linguistic/pragmatic features allows for the development of a more principled framework for specifying what constitutes a microaggression, as well as helping to identify the relevant features of the context and the processes involved in the recognition of microaggressions. 

Abstract Successful language use requires accurate intention recognition. However, sometimes this can be undermined because communication occurs within an interpersonal context. In this research, I used a relatively large set of speech acts (n= 32) and explored how variability in their inherent face‐threat influences the extent to which they are successfully recognized by a recipient, as well as the confidence of senders and receivers in their communicative success. Participants in two experiments either created text messages (senders) designed to perform a specific speech act (e.g., agree) or interpreted those text messages (receivers) in terms of the specific speech act being performed. The speech acts were scaled in terms of their degree of face threat. In both experiments, speech acts that were more threatening were less likely to be correctly recognized than those that were less threatening. Additionally, the messages of the more threatening speech acts were longer and lower in clout than the less threatening speech acts. Senders displayed greater confidence in communicative success than receivers, but judgments of communicative success (for both senders and receivers) were unrelated to actual communicative success. The implications of these results for our understanding of actual communicative episodes are discussed.